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The Economic Effects of Money Laundering on the
Nigerian Economy: Some Emerging Issues
U.. Kama *

Altlwugh the economic effects of 111oney laundering on economic development are
difficult to quan tify, it is evident that such activity damages the financial institutions
which are critical to economic growth. Besides, it reduces productivity in the
economy's real sector by diverting resources and encouraging crime and corruption,
which slow economic growr/7. Furthermore, such activity can distort an economy's
external sector through international trade and capital f]ows to the detriment of
long-tenn econom ic development. This paper attem pts to explore the economic
effects of this malaise on the Nigerian econ om y. ft obsaves that if money laundering
is not tam ed, ,t has the potential of propagating banking system distress, capital
flight and exchange rate misalignment. The paper, therefore, calls for a
technologically driven regulatory framework, reforms of the existing Ir. ,v ofevidence
to tackle electronic dimension of money laundering and domestic forfeiture laws, the
hastening of e-banking and electronic payments system and, finally, a need for global
cooperation in implementing money laundering laws and jurisdictional issues.

Keywords: Money laundering, criminalization, corruption, placement, layering,
integration, reputational risks, reputational effects, Inward and Outbound flows, ebanking.

JEL Classification Numbers: K-12

I.

Introduction

Money laundering has assumed a phenomenal growth the world over and, then is a
renewed thinking that money stinks. This shift fron: the erstwhile view that "pecunia
non olet", meaning that money does not stink, has provided the impetus to la1.LOOer it
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by ens uring that money is used without identifyin g the source and hence, forestall any
danger of confiscation. Money laundering is facilitated through the co-operation of
third parties whose role frustrates the detection and subsequent applicalion of
appropriate sanctions. The criminalization of money laundering is aimed at
disrupting the co-operation provided by third persons in hiding the proceeds from
crime and giving the proceeds a legi timate appearance.
Globally, the fight against money laundering h as been fierce agains t the backd rop of
the attendant consequences associa ted with this type of crime. As the world is
experiencing economic globali zation, economic crimes have also been globalized, and
its modus operandi have become even more sophisticated.
Economic crimes do not only harm individu als, but also sometimes cause great loss to
public proper ty, and could result in the damaging of investors' confidence in doing
business in a particular country, leading them to invest elsewhere. Thus, economic
crimes may ultimateJy undermine the basis for sound socio-economic development in
a country. Nigeria's recognition of the imp ortance of the fight against economic and
financial crime is hinged on its economic consequences on the economy.
Thus, this paper examines the economic effects of money laundering on the Nigerian
economy. It also identifies the trend, transitory and cydical patterns in the net foreign
assets of the deposit money banks (DMBs) in the country in order to put into
perspective the widespread use of DMBs as channel for money laundering activities.
The paper, in addition, reviews the efforts at combating money laundering in Nigeria
and identifies the challenges ahead as well as the measures which will mitigate the
wave of the crime in the country.
In order to achieve this, the paper is organized into sLx sections. Following this
introduction, section lI explains the conceptual issues relating to money laundering
activities. Section rn deals with country experiences and literature review on the
economic effects of money laundering by examining each of the major economic
sectors in turn. Section TV takes a s pecific look at money laundering in Nigerian
economy, while section V presents the issues and challenges emerging from the review
of the various efforts towards combating money laundering in the country. Section VI
draws from the Nigerian and international experiences in proposing a package of
measures to enhance the combating of these crimes in Nigeria before summarizing
and concluding the paper.
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Conceptual Issues in Money Laundering

To appreciate the need or othern·ise for comba ting money laundering and other
n·lated crimes, it would be instructi\•c to examine the meaning of the \'arious concepts
involved in this section.
II. 1

Money Laundering and Stages of Transactions

Conceptuall y, mo ney laundering is the criminal's way of disguising the origin o f his
illicit monc) or financia l assets so that detection and the risk of prosecution in its use
coul d be a\·oiclcd. Legally, it is dcf'inccl as any altempt Lo e ngage in monetary
transaction that inYOl\'eS criminally deri\·ed property (Bauer & Ullmann, 2000). Antimoney-launclering, therefore, is an l'ffort designed to prevent o r limil the ability of
criminals to use their ill-gotten gains (McDm,·ell and Novis, 2001). It is important to
emphasise that cffecti\·e anti-money laundering policies support a variety of other
good-governance policies that assist in sustaining economic development,
particular!, through the strengthening o f the financial sector.
Originally, the scope of money laundering activity was limited to proceeds from drug
trafficking or proceeds from offences related to organized crime, but it has now been
drastically expand ed to cover other, if not all, types of proceeds o f crimes. The
cl,'Ilamics of money laundering invoh·cs trans forming the proceeds of crime into
usable form and disguis ing their illegal origins. After the illicit proceeds arc
introduced to th e financial system , they arc hidden, laundered through a variety of
transactions and fin ancial vehicles and, finally, invested in financial and related
assets. These operations often involve international transactions as a way of obscuring
the source of the funds. Indeed, money laundering is intrinsically global. If one country
or juri sdiction tightens its regul ations on money laundering, the activity will quickly
shift to a less regulated emironment. hen a country with little crime and little money
laundering needs to be proactive to avoid the immigration of the problem. Money
laundering generally involves a series of multiple transactions u sed to disguise the
sour ce of the ill-gotten assets. These transactions typically fall into three s tages that
sometimes overlap:
i)

ii)

Placement: This is the process of placing unlawful proceeds into financiaJ
institutions through deposits, wire transfers, or other means.
Layering: At this stage, the launderer attempts to further obscure the trail of
criminaJly generated funds by separating them from their origin through the use
of complex financial trans actions. For example, sophisticated criminals with
la rge sums to launder, m ay set up big companies in countries known for s trong
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bank secrl'cy laws and transl"er monl'y among th l'sl' compan ies unril th ey arc
sel'mingly clean. Thl'Sl' tran sactions must bl' disguised to blend in w ith orher
legi timat l' tra nsactions that occur l'Ver yday. 1.oan-hacks and double invoicing
arc such oth er com mon techniques employed in th e layering stage. Wi th a loan-back, the criminal puts the fund s in an offshor e en ti ty th at he secr etl y controls
and lat er, th e fu nd s are loaned bal'k to him. T his t <•chniqu e works because i t is
hare.I to dl'tnmine w ho actually con tro ls olTshorl' arc-ounts in soml' countril's. In
th e case or d ou ble-invoicing, an offshor e en tit y kel'ps two sets or books. To move
clean fu nds into Germany fo r instance, a Germa n l'nt it y overcha rges f'or some
goods or services. To move rune.ls ou t (say, to avoid taxes), th e German enti ty is
underch arged.Oth er layeri ng techniques involve t he use· or C'asinos because th<'Y
rl'adil y takl' cash and oncl' conwrted into chips, th l' funds appear to be win nings
wh ich arl' rl'dl'emabil' b y a cheque draw n on th e casino's bank (Bauer and
Ullmann, 2000).
iii)

Integration: This is th e process of u sing an appar en rl y legitimate transaction to
disguise illicit proceeds. At this stage, the fund s arc moved int o thr mainstream
of economic activit ies such as business investment s, real estate or lux ury goods
purchases and others.

II. 2

The Hawala System Informal Funds Transfer Sys tem

In forma l funds tran sfer (IFT) syst ems arc in use in many regions for transferring
funds, both domes ti cally and internationally. The hawala system is one of the ITT
systems th at exist under d ifferent names in various regions o r the world. It is trust-based and is pecu liar to people of Asian/ Midd le Eas t o rigi n. T he hawala sys tem refers
to an informal channel for tra nsferring funds from one locarion to another throu gh
service providers known as haw aladars. Since the Scprcmbcr I I , 200 I ter rorist artack s
on the United St ates, p ublic int erest in the h awala sys rem has increased, fo llowing i ts
alleged role in financing illegal and terrorist act iv iti es along wi th its tradit ional rol e of
trans fer ring money b etween individu als and famili es, and often in d i ffe rent cou ntries.
A h awaladar from country A (I IA) receives fu nds in one curr ency from a cus tomer "CA"
and , in turn, gives CA a code for authenti ca tion purposes. He th en instru cts his
country B correspondent (HB) to deliver an equi valen t amount in th e local currency to a
designated beneficiar y (CB), w ho needs to disclose the cod e to receive the funds. I IA
can be r emunerated by charging a fee or through an exchange rate spr ead. A fter th e
remittance, HA has a liabi l ity to HB, and th e settlement o f their position s is m ade by
various means, either financial or goods and Sl'rvices. Their positions can also be
tran sferred t o other intermediaries, w ho can assume and consolidate the initial
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positions settled at wholesale or multilateral levels.
The ~cl I lcmcnt o f the liability position of I IA vis-ii-vis HB that was created by the initial
tTansaction can be done through imports of goods or "reverse h awala". A reverse
hawala tran saction is often used for investment purposes or to cover travel, medical,
or education expenses from a developing country. In a coun try subject to foreign
exchange and ca p it al controls, a customer (XB) interested in transferring funds abroad
ror, in this case, unive rs it y tuition fees, provides local currency to HB and reques ts that
the 1:quivalcnt amounl be made available to the cus tomer's son (XA) in another country
(A). Cus1omcrs are not aware if the transaction they initiate is a hawala or a reverse
hawala transaction. HB may use HA directly if funds arc needed by XB in country A or
indirectl y by asking h im to use another correspondent in another country, where
funds arc expected to be delivered. A reve rse hawala tra nsaction does not necessarily
imply that the settlement transaction has to involve the same hawaladars. It could
involve other hawaladars and b e tied to a different transaction. Therefore, it can be
simple or complex. Furthermore, the s e ttlement can also take place through import
transactions. For instance, HA would settle his d ebt by financing exports to country B,
where HB could be the importe r or an intermediary.
II.3 Directions of Money Laundering Flows
Five directions of money laundering flows could be evident in an economy and these

include:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)
(v)

Domestic money laundering flows: This is a process by which illegal domestic
runds a rc laundered within the country's econom y and reinvested or otherwise
spent within the economy.
Returning laundered funds: Under this, laundered funds originating from a
pa rticular d eveloping country formerly launde red partially or in full abroad arc
returned for integration in the originating country.
Inbound funds: This is a case for which the predicate crime occurred abroad are
either initially laundered (placed) abroad or within the country, and ultimately
are integrated into the economy.
Outbound funds: These typicall y con s titute illicit capital flight from the
economy and do not return for integration in the original economy.
Flow-through funds: These enter the country as part of the laundering process
and largely depart for integration elsewhere, thus playing little or no role in the
economy itself (although the 'fees' for money laundering activity may remain).
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ll.4

Other Related Crimes

Other related economic and financial crimes range from conventional types such as
embezzlement and breach of trust to new types such as c:ollusi,c bidding, cartels,
insider tradi ng, market manipulation and internet crime "hich arc increasingly
getting more diversified, complicated and sophis ticated.

III.

Country E'<perience and Literature Re\iew

111.1 CountryExperiences

An extensive UN study of the effect of money laundering on Russia noted that in the
Russian Federation, mone} laundering is ah,ays linked to the problrm of capital Fl ight
and a subsequent lack of investments. IL was estimated that the amount of illicit
capital flight laundered from Russia in rrcent time exceeds SJ 00 billion, implying an
enormous drain on investment resources (UN Report 2001).
The U.S. Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) recently Je,ied a S20 million fine
on Bank of Chin a because its employees allegedly committed favoritism, irregularities,
issued fraudulent letters of credit and facilitated loan frauds in the Bank's New York
operations. AJso, two branch managers and an assistant manager of the Bank of China
at its Kaiping branch allegedly colluded with government officials and contractors in
Hong Kong to defraud the Bank of S7j million. Following the disclosure of th e
incident, there was a run on the Bank's Kaiping branch. Consequently. the Bank of
China's reputation suffered, and plans to list its Hong Kong s ubsidiary on public stock
exchanges are now in question (Fang, 2002).
The French authorities in late 200 l launched a series of investigations into officials of
Ftance's leading banks in connection with fraud, tax evasion as well as money
laundering. The subsequent report showed that thousands of French cheques, some of
them stolen, were endorsed or signed over to new beneficiaries before being cashed at
money-changers in Israel and the proceeds exceed ing S70 million were returned to
France through correspondent banking relationships (The Banker, 2000; The
Jerusalem Post, 2001).
Following its bankruptcy in 1995, the Dusscldorf prosecutors investigated 1O fo rmer
employees of a private bank, BVH on s uspicion of fraud, disloyalty and money
laundering, and discovered that the bank laundered funds in the form of bogus
credits, and redirected them to a firm believed to have belonged to Osama Bin Laden's
AJ-Qaeda network (Sonntag, am Welt, 2001).
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111.2 Review of Literature on the Effect of Money Laundering

Although it is difficult to quant ify the impacts of money laundering on economic
development, yet it is clear that such activity has some damaging effects on the
fi nancial institutions which are sine qua non to economic growth. It also reduces
productivity in a country's real sector by diverting resources and encouraging crime
and corruption, which slow dmvn economic growth. Furthermore, such activity can
distort the economy's external sector through international trade and capital flows to
the detriment of long-term economic development. In what follows, we shall attempt
to review existing literature on these issues sector by sector.
In the view of Comley (2001), banks, equ ity markets and non-bank fi nancial
institutions (NBFls), such as insurance companies have been identified as favoured
means of perpetrating money laundering activities both internationally and within
countries. The reason for this preference, according to him, lies in the efficiency of the
financial institutions in providing funds for the actors of such crimes. He further
noted that money laundering through financial institutions affects such institutions
themselves in 3 broad ways: by incr easing the probability that individual customers
will be defrauded by corrupt indjviduals within the institution; by increasing the
probability that the institution itself will become corrupt or even controlled b y
criminal interests; and by increasing the risk of financial failure faced by the
institution as a result of the institution itself being defrauded. Such dangers, he stated,
come under operational risk and can contribute significantly to reputational risks. A
reputation for integrity, no doubt, is one of the most valued assets by investors. Money
laundering activity cons titutes clear operational risks to the financial soundness of an
institution; adversely affects jurisdiction's reputation; undermines investors' trust in
the economy; and above all weakens the financial system.
Furthermore, Strachan, Smith and Beedles (1983) have noted that financial institutions
in the developing economies are often undergoing a transition from being state-owned
to private-investor ownership and control, and as such investors are more reluctant to
commit funds to obtain ownership in enterprises cited for corruption, particularly
money laundering activities. Also, from a developing country's policymaking
standpoint, he observed that a country with la-x anti-money-laundering enforcement
measures can be subject to formal legal sanctions by important trade and investment
partners.
Molina (1995) in his study has noted that apart from its impact on countries' financial
sectors, money laundering also has more direct effects on economic growth in the real
sector through the following ways: by diverting resources to less-productive activity

30

CBN Economic & Financial Review \ ·01. .J3, No.l

or investments that generate little additional productivity for the broader economy
such as jewelry, ltL\.'l.lIY automobiles and real estate, money laundering activity tends
to depress growth in an economy. For de\'(~loping countries, the diversion of such
scarce resources to less-productive domestic assets or luxury imports is a major
obstacle to economic growth.
He further noted that criminal organizations can transform productive enterprises
into sterile investments by operating them for the purposes of laundering illicit
proceeds rather than as profit-maximising enterprises rcsponsi\'e to consumer
demand and worthy of legitimate investment capital. Ile stated that the content of
trade, particularly imports can also be warped by money laundering acti,·ity. For
example, a corrupt official may decide to launder his illicit funds outside the country
and return the proceeds to the country for his own consumption and enjoyment.
Money laundering also facilitates corruption and crime within developing economies,
which in tum depresses growth.
Unabated money laundering can also impair a developing country's economy through
trade and international capital flows. Loungani, and Mauro, (2002) commenting on
capital flight from Russia noted that a money laundering technique that docs not
directly involve the financial system or expenditures in the real domestic economy is
the use of inaccurate pricing (miss-invoicing or over invoicing) of imports or exports to
hide the transfer of funds during the layering process \\'ithin what appears to be a
value-for-value transaction. When such transactions are extensive, he noted, the
impact on a country's entire external sector can be substantial.
As recently noted by the UvJF, money laundering activity can through reputational
effects affect the willingness of economic agents, particularly those outside the
country to conduct businesses like inward investment, banking correspondent
relationships, among others, in a particular country with its adverse consequences.
The effects of money laundering on foreign investment are much because of its
blockage of special benefits such as technology, labour skills and know-how, and
immediate access to international distr ibution channels that such foreign resources
bring to developing economjes.
According to the Brooking Event Transcript (1999), money laundering has been
identified as a key element in illicit capital night from devel op ing countries. He
observed that the massive illicit capital flight from Nigeria si nce the mid-l 990s made
full use of money-laundering cen ter s in the developed world, and were largely n ot
being repatriated, contrary to the notion that money laundering is a problem involving
illicit developed country fund s being laundered in the developing world.
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Abbott (2000) asserts that for most developing countries, the creation of an off-shore
financial center (OFC) is seen as a panacea for their economic disadvantages.
Specifically, man y OFCs have b een created as part of developing countries' efforts to
develop their domestic economics through the pro,·ision of in ternational finan cial
sen·ices.
In contrast, Palan and Abbo tt (El9G) have as<;ertecl that the Bahamas " ·as the third
larges t offshore banking center in the world, but by the end of t he 1980s, had fallen 10
11•h place as a result of ,,·ide<;pread publicity concerning dru g trafficking and
corruption of its ins titutions. In an extreme case, Panama's growth as an OFC was
reversed as the \Olume of money laundering expanded 10 such Ic,·els that the enlirc
finan cial system was viewed as corrupt, and funds were massively moved fro m the
country's finan cial system even before the U.S government began a pplying sanctions
against it.

IV.

Money Laundering: The Nigerian Experience

Historically, the insurgence of money laundering activity in Nigeria dates back to the
declining fortunes of the oil boom, following the collapse of prices in the international
oil market in the 1080s and the ensuing austerity measures associated wi th the
count ry's Structural Adjustme nt Programme. This has since then encouraged
unprecedented greed and avarice, resulting in gra,·e crimes like corruption, fraud,
armed robbery, ritual killing, assassination, drugs peddling, prostitution, advance fee
fraud (a.k. a "-! 19"), money laundering, currency cou nterfeiting, oil bunkering, bank
fraud, illegal contract deal, e-mail scam and other such related crimes, among
Nigerians. Regrettably, these n efarious acts resulted in decreased productivity and
negatively impacted on the image of Nigerians as crooks a nd dupes in the international
circle. While efforts have been made b y inte rnational agencies to combat money
laundering, the crime seems to be gradually eating deep into the economic fabrics of
Nigeria.
In 2000, igeria was adjudged by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a Paris-based
ant i-m on ey laundering body, as one of the non-cooperative countries or territories
(NCCTs) in the fight against money laundering. Prior to FATF's assessment,
Trans parency International had categorized Nigeria as one of the most corrupt in the
world. Also, the UK's financial s uperviso ry authorities estima ted that illicit
transactions in UK accounts that originated fro m Nigeria amoun ted to abou t S 1.3
billion between 1996 and 2000. There are numerous cases of money laundering in the
country. A few of them are proven cases. A large number of them are still b eing
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investigated, while others are being prosecuted. A few of the proven cases include a
deceased legislator in the lower house of the National Assembly and the celebrated
case of a Nigerian widmr involving a Brazilian nationalc, among others.
In realization of the adverse consequences of such brazen crimes on the economy,
particularly now that the country is striving for economic rebirth, the Federal
Government in March 2003 inaugurated the Economic and Finan cial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) and charged it with the responsibility of investigating economic
and financial crimes in the country and bringing the perpetrators to book.
Interestingly, the EFCC has all what it takes to tackle head-on the hydra-headed
monster of economic and financial crimes in the country as the Commission was
established by an enabling Act of the National Assembly in December 2002. Of more
paramount importance is the recognition of EFCC by the FfAF, a reputable
international body that is committed to combating economic and financial crimes
around the world. Under Section 7 (2) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 200-1, the
Commission is the coordinating agency for the enforcement of the Money Laundering
(Prohibition) Act, 2004. T he EFCC has a 21-member board drawn from the law
enforcement agencies (LEAs), regulators and the private sector, including the Nigerian
Police, the Department of State Security Services (SSS), the Nigeria Customs Service,
ational Drug Law Enforcement Agency ( DLEA), Central Bank of Nigeria (CB ),
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC),
the Nigeria Postal Service (NPS), National Insurance Commission (NAICOM), the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the National Intelligence Agency ( IA),
Represen tatives from the Federal Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs and Finance, the
Nigerian Communications Commission ( CC), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS)
and -1 members representing the pri vate sector. The EFCC is also the parent body of the
Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), which is the central body for collecting and
analyzing all financial data, including suspicious transactions reports from all
financial institutions and designated non-financial institutions for the purpose of
developing intelli gence packages for law enforcement agencies and
regulatory/supervisory bodies.
IV. 1 Methodological Issues And Analysis on Money Laundering

Empirical data on money laundering is scanty and this study provides a novel step
towards a quantita tive insigh t into the effects of money launderin g on the economy.
The discussion below highlights two key univariate time series decomposition
techniques for the purpose of bringing out the severity of the problem. Oth er ratios
were also considered in order to identify what proportion of the GDP is a cos t
associated with money laundering activities.
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In the d ecompos ition of the Univariate time series data, two methodologies used in the
framework could be identified, namely, the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition and the
Hodrick-Prescott filter. Su ffice it to say that while the multivariate framework is at the
vortex o f discussions of modem macroeconometrics, the u ni variate framework will
now be succinctly discussed and fitted into the curre nt study as the multivariate
framework techniques are beyond the scope of this study. Such an application to
money laundering is novel and would provide intuitive in sight into th e intens ity of
money laundering in igeria based on banks' fore ign assets portfolio.
Beverigde and elson (198 1) provide an elegant way of decomposing a non-stationary
time series data into a permanen t and a temporary (cyclical) compone nts by applying
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) methods. For any non-stationary
time series x., integrated of the first order, the Wold decomposition theorem could be
applied to its firs t differen ce, to deliver the following representation:

= µ + C (L) E1,
~ n.i.d. (0, 82,.),

6X1

E1

where C(L) is a polynomial of order q in the Jag operator. The final equation can tak e
the form
X1

= C* (L) Et+ µt + C (I) Zt,
=C1+ TR1,

where z, is a process for which 6z1 = E1• C, is the cyclical component and TR is the trend
component made up of a dete rminis tic and a stoch as tic trend. The trend component
could b e represen ted as:
TRt = TRt- 1 + ~t + C(J)c1•
The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter was proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) to
analyze postwar US bus iness cycles in a working paper circulated in the early 1980s
and published in 1997. The filter computes the permanent component, TR, of a series
x, b y minimizing the variance of x, around TR., subject to a penalty that constrains the
second difference of TR,. The expression minimized to derive the filter is given by

f,., ~.- rR,) + 1cI [(rn ,. - TR ,) - <TR, - TR,_,) ]
1

The penalty parameter ,. controls the smoothness of the series, by controlling the ratio
of the variance of the cyclical component and the variance of the series. The lar ger the
>.. , the smoother the TR, approaches a linear trend. In practical terms 1. is set to 100 for
annual data, 1600 for quarterly data and 14400 for monthly data.
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Evidence suggests that the Beveridge-Nelson trend is more volatile than the HodrickPrescott trend (Favero, 2001). It is plausible for the volatility of the Hodrick-Prescott
trend to increase by reducing the parameter i. . However, the Hodrick-Prescott filter
reaches at most the volatility of the actual time-series, which is smaller than the
volatility of the Beveridge-Nelson trend (Favero, 2001). Though Harvey and Jaeger
(1993) showed that the use of the HP filter could lead to the identification of spu rious
cyclical behaviour, a key advantage of the filter is that of removing the same trend
from all time-series.

IV. Relevance of the HP Filter in the Study of Money Laundering
Money launderers subvert legitimate fin ancial mechanisms and banlJng relationshi ps
by using them as protective covering for the movement of criminal proceed s and the
financing of crime and terrorism. By so doing, money laundering undermines the
integrity of global financial and trading systems upon which prosperity and growth
depend. Anecdotal evidence show that transactions involving such offshore
jurisdictions make it difficult for law enforcement officials and regulators to follow
the trail of money earned by criminals, organized international criminal enterprises,
and global terrorist organizations. Correspondent banlJng facilities are one of th e
banking mechanisms susceptible in some circums tances to manipulation by foreign
banks to permit th e laundering of fund s by hiding the identity of real parties in some
financial transactions. Thus, private banking services can be susceptible to
manipulation by money launderers, for example corrupt foreign government officials.
This i s particularly so if those services include the creation of offshore accounts and
facilities for large personal funds transfers to channel funds into accounts around the
globe. In view of this, foreign assets holdings of banks become the hub for
concealment of money laundering transactions. Since it has been a difficult exercise
even for regulators to break-in on suspicion of banks activities in perpetuating money
laundering, the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter provides a prima facie evidence of the
severity of the problem. This scenario is typical of the United States where anti-money
laundering efforts are impeded by outmoded and inadequate statutory provisions
that make inves tigations, prosecutions, and forfeitures more difficult, particularly in
cases in which money laundering involves foreign persons, foreign banks, or foreign
countries. The HP filter enables the identification of the irregular components of
banks foreign assets holding as it moves away from its trend path. This is why, for
instance, in the European Union countries, credit institutions are expected to ensure
that their associated companies, in particular financial services institutions and
financial institutions comply with their respective duties under the Act. Locally
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resident branches of foreign credit institutions are also subject to the Money
Laundering Act. The next section experiments with the filter and discusses it in the
context of the role which money laundering activities play on the Nigerian economy.
IV.3 Money Laundering Activities in Nigeria Between 1992 and 20 04

Evidence from the HP filter on the net foreign assets ( FA) of the deposit money banks
(DMBs) in Nigeria (see figure 1), indicated that between 1992 and 1995 when money
laundering was evidently criminalized in the country, the level was above its potential
level.
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2003

Figure 1: Trend and Transitory Movements in Net Foreign Assets
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This was reminiscent of the high volu me of investible resources held-up by th e DMBs
in their correspondent banks overseas. The An ti-Money Laundering Act o.3 of 1995,
which institutionalized information disclosure by the banks, however, led to a
significant decline in the level of banks' NFA between 1995 and 2001. This period
clearly indicated that without the activities of money laund erers, the DMBs were
largely insulated and un-integrated into the globa l financial architecture as it was
evident that the banks, within this period could not attain the potential level of their
NFA. Banks' level of FA again surged between 2001 and 200-l, reflecting the
institutional weaknesses in the enforcement of the various anti-money laundering
Acts (fig. I). The banks became havens for transferring ill-gotten funds abroad through
the use of diplomatic covers to exploit laws with a view to escaping prosecution.
Anecdotal evidence on Nigeria collaborate the above trend and puts the number of
arrest on money laundering cases since 1995 at 2469, while the number of
prosecutions and convictions were respectively, 154 and 12. The estimated value of
laundered money from Nigeria is put at an annual average of i'H0 billion, representing
0.012 per cent of the country's GDP (2004 current basic prices) and 2.4 per cent in real
term. These figures are scaring compared with global losses associated with the crime.
For instance, money laundering has been estimated by the International Monetary
Fund to amount to b etween 2 and 5 percent of global gross domestic product, which is
at leas t $600,000,000,000 annually.
For the avoidance of doubt (see Table 1), bi-annual findings of the Nigerian Financial
Intelligence Unit (NFIU) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
(Ribadu, 2005) indicate that 10 out of the 92 reporting institutions including banks
accounted for 100 and 97. 7 per cent of all suspicious transactions reports (STRs) by
the firs t and second quarter of 2005, respectively. By the first six months of 2005, 25
banks accounted for 84.4 per cent of currency transactions reports (CTR) renditions
received by the NFIU. 1n terms of absolute numbers, the NFIU received 1,299 STRs,
1,324,592 CTRs and 64,573 financial transactions reports (FTRs) in the first 6 months
of the year.
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Table 1: Rendition to NFIU for the First Half of 2005

Period

STR

CTR

TTR

Firs t Quarter of Year 2005

346

4 81 ,920

19,973

Second Quarter of Year 2005

953

842,672

--14,600

First Half of Year 2005

1,299

1,324,592

64,573

IV.4 Review of Efforts towards Combating Money Laundering and Other Related
Crimes in Nigeria

Nigeria has long realized the adverse effects of money laundering and other related
crimes and the fact that it was in her interest to actively participate in the fight against
these crimes. 1n this regard, the country has adopted various strategies aimed at
combating them. For instance, Nigeria passed an Anti-Money Laundering Act in
December 2001, which expanded the scope of the earlier one of 1995 from drugs to
any crimes or illegal act. These, however, excluded certain anti-money laundering
obligations to non-bank financial institutions, and the need to extend customer
identification requirements to include occasional transactions of S500 or more.
Nigeria followed up by enacting the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC) Act in December 2002 with far reaching functions and powers which cut across
crimes involving advance fe e fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal charge
transfers, futures market fraud, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments,
computer credit card fraud, and contract scam, among others. The country took
another step by enacting the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 200-l, which
consolidated the previous anti-money laundering legislations and provided a broader
interpretation of financial institutions and scope of supervision of regulatory
authorities on money laundering activities.
The strategies already taken by the country in the fight against money laundering and
other related crimes are as summarized b elow:
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•

The establishment of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) in
1990 by Decree No. -18 to check drug-trafficking and its associated money
laundering activities.
The establishment of a special fraud unit within the Nigeria Police charged with
the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting cases bordering on criminal
d eception or advance fee fraud.
The selling up of the Money Laundering Surveillance Unit in the Central Bank of
Nigeria in 199-!. The Unit is charged with the respons ibili ty of ens uring !hat the
banks and other financia l institutions comply with the provisions of the i\loney
Laundering Guidance Notes, .\1oney Laundering Act and observe the "Know Your
Customers" directives issued by the CB .
The enactment of the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial
Malpractices in Banks Act No l 8 of 199-l aimed at trapping the officials and
customers of banks who had looted the banks' treasury.
The promulgation of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences
Act o 13 in 1995.
The appointment of a Special Adviser to the President on Drugs and Financial
Crimes and the establishment of the high-powered Inter-Ministerial Committee
on Crimes.
The establishment of Lhe Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee
(FSRCC) in 1998, comprising the Central Bank of igeria, Securities and
Exchange Commission, National Insurance Commission, Corporate Affairs
Commission and Federal Ministry of Finance. The Committee co-ordinates the
supervision of the financial ins titutions in the country and shares information
on areas of corruption and fraud practices relating to their customers as well as
employees.
The establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) to
implement the anti-corruption law of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 200-l.

•

•

•

•
•

•

•
•

The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 200-! and for matters connected therewith
seeks to:
:.;
Provide for the r epeal of the Money Laundering Act, 2003;
:-:
Make comprehensive provisions to prohibit the laundering of the proceeds of
crin1e; and
:-:
Provide appropriate penalties and e~'Pand the interpretation of financial
institutions and scope of supervision of regulatory authorities on money
laundering activities, among other things.
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The major provisions of the 200-l Act included:
:-:
:-:

x
:-:

:•:

Limitation to make or accept cash payment;
Duty to report international trans fer of funds and securities;
Identification of customers; special surveillance on certain trans actions;
preservation of records;
Arousing awareness among employees of financial ins titutions; mandatory
disclosu re by financial institution; liability of directors, etc. of finan cial
ins titutions;
Surveillance of bank accounts, etc; and other offences.

The detail s of these major provisions of the 200-l Act can be found in the original
document.

IV.5 The Effects of Money Launde ring on the Nigerian Economy
Quantifiable effects of money laundering on the economy may not be assessed
accurately with the information available. Economic models are capable of tracing the
multiplier effects of money taken from one sector of the economy and sp ent in
another sector, but there is little sys tematic data on how launder ed money is spent.
When illicitly gained money is spent on lavish real estate, there is probably a net loss to
the economy, but where it is nirned into legitimate businesses, the net effects can be
quite positive to the economy. The perceived costs to the Nigerian economy, however,
could be discussed in the context of international best practices vis-a-vis the
characteris tics and Yulnerabilities of the economy. In view of this, the centre-piece of
the discussion is the financial, real and external sectors of the economy.
ln the first place, money laundering has the potential of accelerating banking system
distress: financial institutions arc conduit for matching investors' and savers' needs
through the intermediation process.
Money laundering in igeria has, however, increased reputational risks o f banks as
most of them are after hot money, without minding the source, thereby abandoning
their traditional role of intermediation. This perhaps is one of the reasons why banks
keep large proportions of their trans actions off-balance sheet. Insight into this
behaviour can be seen from figure 2. The period 1999-2003 for which the net foreign
assets increased above its potential level (fig l) correlates with the period that both the
ban king system's total assets and off-balance sheet transactions averaged 39.8 and
7.--l percent of GDP, res pectively, (fig 2). As a catalyst for sys temic crisis, the period also
reflected that the significant proportion of its assets " ·ere in non-performing assets
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(NPA) which averaged 2.9 per cent of GDP. Thus, there are renewed possibilities that
individual customers will be defrauded b y incLividuals and their crony institutions.
The consequence is to undermine investor confidence in the financial system,
especially in the context of weak legal sys tem that could hardly compel enforcement of
anti money laundering laws.
Figure 2: Some Selected Ratios On Bank Behaviour
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BSA/ GDP represents the ratio of total banking system assets to GDP
NPA/ GDP is the ratio of non·performing assets of banks to GDP
OBS/BSA is the ratio of off·balance sheet items to banking system assets
OBS/ GDP represents the ratio of off-balance sheet item to GDP
Capital fligh t, in addition to expenditure switching into less productive areas due to
money laundering, has starved the real sector of investment funds with the
consequence of denying growth in the emerging small business enterprises in the
economy. Very recently, public opinions have indicated how highly placed bureaucrats
fingered to be money launderers invest in real estate involving several billions ofnaira
in the country. Indeed, laundered money has been used to fu nd illegal businesses like
drug counterfeiting and other related crimes in the country. All these inhibit growth
and undermine human capital development. This is fundamental ly so because money
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laundering has encouraged corruption and crime to the detriment of boosting a more
vibrant manufacturing sector of the econo my.
More fundamentally, money laundering poses s ubstantial volatility on Nigeria's
exchange rate and cons trains the gro\\·th of foreign direct inves tment. It has been
observed that the naira exchange rate differential reflects to a large extent a premium
that purchasers of forei gn exch ange an.' \\illing to pay to falsify import documents so
th at they could evade custom duties, or to make transfers th at were otherwise
res tri cted or illicit. This means that the demand for foreign exchange could be inflated
by money-laundering activities using trade channels, driving up the price of foreign
exchange. By driving up the igerian exchange rate, the mere technique of using trade
as a money laundering technique had reduced the competitiveness of igerian exports
on world markets, thus slowing the country's economic growth (sec IMF Staff Report
on Nigeria, 2001). Again, in Nigeria, money launderers are being prosecuted today by
the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) for u sing illicit funds outside
the country to import luxury vehicles in a bid to return the proceeds to the country for
their own consumption. The process of integrating rather than repatriating the funds
abroad by importing foreign goods switches growth-enhancing domestic demand to
imports thereby precipitating macroeconomic volatility in the country.
In addition, the reputational effects of money laundering affect the willingness of
economic agents, particularly those outside the country to conduct businesses like
inward investment, banking correspondent relationships, among others, with its
adverse consequences on the econo my. The effects o f money laundering on foreign
investment in Nigeria are substantial because of its blockage of special benefits such
as technology, labour skills and know-how, and immediate access to international
dis tribution channels that s uch foreign resources could bring to the country. For
instance, the massive illicit capital flight from the economy since the mid-1 990s made
full use of money-laundering centers in the developed world, and were largely not
being repatriated, contrary to the notion that money laundering is a problem involving
illicit developed country funds being laundered in the developing world.
Again, igeria being on the lis t of CCTs of the Financial Action Tas k Force m eans that
the country is considered a high-risk country to make financial transactions in, and the
implication is that international fin ancial ins titutions often impose premium charges
on transactions involving Nigerian financial institutions. Also being on the lis t often
makes it very difficult for Nigerians living overseas to open accounts, especially in
branches of multinational financial ins titutions as FATF had warned that special
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attention should be given to bu siness relations and transactions with person s,
including companies and financial institu tions from the CCTs.
There are other significant social costs and risks associated with money laundering in
the country. Money laundering allows drug traffickers, s mugglers and other crirrunals
to expand their operations. This is capable of driving up th e cost of gO\·ernance due to
the need for increased law enforcement and health care expenditures (for example, for
treatmen t of drug addicts) to combat the serious consequences th at it brought into
society.
Again, money laund ering transfers economic power from the market, government and
citizens to crirrunals. Furthermore, the sheer magnitud e of the econorruc power that
accrues to criminals from money laundering has a corrupting effect on all elements of
the society. In extreme cases, it can lead to the virtual take-over of legitimate
government. Overall, the possible social and political costs of money laundering on
the Nigerian economy, if left unchecked , are capable of weakening the social fabrics,
collective ethical standards, and, ultimately the democra tic institutions of the society.

V.

Emerging Issues and Challenges

Despite the various approaches adopted b y the country in the fight agains t money
laundering and other related crimes, and the successes achieved so far, the incidence
of financial crimes continues to p ersist, while the rate of prosecution and conviction is
rather slow. This is because of the complex nature of the phenomenon and the
challenges Nigeria is facing in its enforcement efforts.
V. l

The Regulatory Challenge

The anonymity enjoyed by the operators in the unregulated business activities in
Nigeria facilitates the perpetration of these crimes. There are a number of handicaps
facing the Nigeria Police such as operational logistics, funding, training, motivation,
manpower and combat equipment. In addition, the phenomenal advances in
technology, which have exposed our economy to various forms of econorruc and
financial crimes; and the increasingly sophisticated equipment and methods used by
the perpetrators in their nefarious activities, give them greater advantage ahead of the
law enforcement agents in the country. Specifically, limited technology and
infrastructure at the dis posal of the regulatory and law enforcement authorities in the
country make detection of crimes and prosecution of criminals extrem ely difficult.
There is, therefore, need to provide the law enforcement authorities and other
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regulatory agencies with up-to-date equipment to enable them to be alive to their
responsibilities.

V.2

Legal Reforms

The cons traint imposed by the requirements of the igerian law poses a great
· challenge for the fi ght agains t money laund ering an d other related crimes in the
country. Nigeria o perates the common law criminal jurisprudence of presumption of
innocence, and the requirement of the rules of evidence pushes the burden of
establishing the gujlt of an accused person to the prosecution (Sections 95 and 97 of
the Evidence Act of Nigeria). This makes the tes timon y of victims of crimes,
particularly in cases of advance fee scams vital in crimi nal proceedings. This differs
from the French jurisdiction which declares an accused person guilty until proven
otherwise.
Allied to this, is the s low pace of the judicial process due largely to under-staffing and
obsolete procedures. There is also the associated difficulty of tendering electronic
documents as evidence under the Nigerian Law of Evidence in the prosecu tion of
money laundering cases. For ins tance, it is arguable wheth er a computer printout
qualifies as documentary evidence and if so, under what class of documentary
evid ence it is to be categorized. The argument is held on the premise that such a
printout cannot be described as the original document as the data on it was r etrieved
from some other s torage medium, e.g., hard or floppy disk. Likewise, since the original
is in some "object" or machlne code form, a printout, which is produced in a different
form cannot be said to b e a copy of the original.
This unsettled state of the law, regarding admjssibility of computer-generated
evidence, requires urgent legislative intervention before international crimjnals turn
Nigeria to a haven for digital or cyber cash laundering. Furthermore, Jimjtations of
domestic forfeiture laws can lead to complex and time consumjng legal issues with
respect to jurisdiction and the venue for the forfeiture case. This is particularly true in
cases in which the Nigerian law enforcement agency does not know initially the final
destination or beneficiary of the funds sen t through a correspondent account and only
discovers this fact at a later point in time.

V.3

The Payments System and e-Banking Challenge

The poor ban.king habit among Nigerians and the cash and carry orientation of the
economy remains the greatest asset to money launderers and, thus, a predicament to
an effective ant-money laundering policy in the country. Though the Money
Laundering Act prohibits cash transactions above NS00,000 and N2 ,000,000 for
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individuals and companies, res pectively, and requires the reporting of banking
transactions above these limits to the EFCC/ 1DLEA, the practicabil ity of s uch
r egulations is doubtful, especially in a cash and carry economy like Nigeria. Such
regulations, no doubt, can be effective in countries with advanced financial systems
where large cas h transactions arc unnecessary and , thus, naturally raise suspicion.
The sa me cannot be sai d of Nigeria where large cash transactions, though unsafe, are
not uncommon due to lack of confidence in the financial system. In addition, due to
our low level of technological advancement, internet usage has been a source of
financial fraud in the country. As long as people are not exposed in the use of the
modern electronic means of payment, the problem will continue to linger.

V.4

The Challenge of Globalization and Good Corporate Governance

The use of correspondent banks poses a great challenge for anti-money laundering law
enforcement officials in the country as they often encounter difficulty while trying to
de termine the actual location of the laundered fund s as well as the jurisdiction to
focus for future efforts. Even where law enforcement agents request the assistance of
the correct foreign jurisdiction, the ability to for feit these funds depends upon the
strength of the forfeiture laws in that jurisdiction, which if available, may be
incompatible with the home country law. It may al so depend upon the cooperation of
the foreign government as currently being experienced in the country. The challenge
for the country, there fore, lies in reforms that will create partnerships or memoranda
of understanding to be able to track and deal with this issue. As long as there arc
existences oflegal and enforcement gaps in the country, the fight against international
dimension of money laundering may remain elusive.

V.5

Cross-border Jurisdictional Issues

As money laundering crimes frequently transcend border, the issue of the appropriate
jurisdiction in which to commence legal actions is a crucial one for a victim seeking to
initiate action agains t the offender. The most common method to find jurisdiction is
by ser vice of process. This is easy if the defendant is within jurisdiction. In the cases of
international criminal proceedings, there is a s trong possibility that the court applied
to, will be reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground that there is a more
appropriate forum (or that it is a forum non conveniens) for the action. Again , there is
a s trong possibility of a court's reluctance to grant extradition of the offender.
Although there are principles of conflict of laws to decide in what circumstances
jurisdiction should be exercised, the conflict of law principles also differs from
country to country. This could result in the victim going from court to court in search
of a suitable jurisdiction, the possibility of which is likely to be a strong deterrent to
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taking any legal action. The near mirage of not getting justice in the face of
jurisdictional problems makes the fight against money laundering difficult. Again,
only through international cooperation and synchronization of international laws that
relative success could be achieved in the country.
V.6

High-Tech Transnational Issues

As the use of Internet and other new technologies increase, more money launderers
are provided with opportunities to commit such crimes remotely, via telephone lines
and data networks. Presently, malicious programming code and harmful
communication pass through several carriers located in different countries. As
banking and finance infrastructures are increasingly becoming networked, there is the
possibility of them being vulnerable to cyber-attack from distant locations. This poses
a great challenge in the efforts to combat money laundering activities. There is,
therefore, the need to ens ure that people are protected from those who use new
technologies for financial and other related crimes anywhere in the world.

VI. Policy Recommendations, Summary and Concluding Remarks
VI. l Policy Recommendations

The need for strict anti-money laundering policies in the country cannot be
overemphasized. To achieve this would require:
Enhanced Resources for Financial Institutions Supervision

Sufficient resources should be d evoted to the surveillance of the financial institutions,
the enforcement of anti-money laundering standards, and cooperation with overseas
authorities through innovative technology; reinforcement of good corporate
governance in the financial institutions; reforms of the legal, financial and law
enforcement structures in the economy; public enlightenment and on-going training
of staff of financial institutions on the money laundering activities; and the need for
global cooperation in implementing money laundering laws and jurisdictional issues
involved. Financial institutions constitute key element in the perpetration of financial
crimes and in the trail and detection of proceeds of criminal activities. This is because
of their unique role in the payments system and the collection and transfer of financial
assets and instruments. Bank supervisors should, therefore, play a leading role in this
crusade, due to the increasing abuse of the financial system in the perpetration of
financial crimes and the danger posed to the integrity of the system. The need for
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increased surveillance of the financial system can, therefore, not be over-emphasized.
The establishment of the Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee is, in
this regard, a welcome d evelopment as it will facilitate the much needed co-ordination
among regulatory bodies and, thus, h elp to eliminate r egulatory arbitrage.
Training and Re-Training of Bank Staff on Money Laundering Techniques

Banks should conduct ongoing training programmes fo r their staff to review money
laund ering techniques, anti-mon ey laundering procedures, charges in applicable laws
and regulations and the kind of transactions lhat may warrant investigations. This
regular training should also include how to identify and fo llow up on unusual or
suspicious activities. The banks should train, not only all personnel who have account
relationships but also appropriate back office personnel In addition, all new
employees should be provided with guidelines concerning anti-money laundering
procedures and should be made to sign an attestation that he or she has read them.
Evaluations of personnel should include how well each employee adheres to the banks'
anti-money-laundering policy. Transactions or transfers in excess of a stipulated
amount should be reported to the regulatory bodies promptly.
Good Corporate Governance Issue

Beyond protecting financial institutions from the negative effects of money
laundering such as erosion of confidence, the adoption of anti-money-laundering
policies by government financial supervis ors and regulators, as well as by banks and
NBFis, can reinforce the other good-governance practices that are important in
confidence building as well as t he development of the financial insti tutions.
Improved Legislation

The necessary legal, financial and law en forcement structures must be in place in
order to combat m oney laundering and oth er related crimes. The forty
recommendations plus nine other special recommendations of the FATF, which is the
accepted international standard in this regard, outline the steps that coun tries must
take to protect themselves from money laundering abuse. For instance, FATF
recommends that each country must ensure that its own law enforcement agencies,
regulators, and j udicial system are communicating, sharing vital information, and
working together. In addition, the full range of regulatory measures such as
comprehens ive bank supervision and a system of s uspicious activity reporting are
necessary to deter and dictate money laundering.
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International Cooperation and Exchange of Information
The a uthorities res ponsible for anti-money laundering, tax and financial regulations
are expected to cooperate closely to combat cross-border finan cial crime, tax evasion
and regulatory abuse, res pectively. These authorities s hould permit effective routin e
supervision of the cross-bord er act ivities of financial ins titutions. The authoriti es
s hould actively participate in international and reg ional seminars and conferences to
increase knowledge and cooperation against economic and financial crimes. Indeed, it
is important that the nations of the world work together to exchange informa tion and
to provide corporation in inves tigation and access fo r future cases. In the US fo r
ins tance, it is the policy and prac tice, pursuant to s tatutory a uthority, to s hare the
proceeds of success forfeiture actions with countries that made possible or
substan tially facilitated the forfeiture of access under US law (Lester, 200 I). We believe
that assets s haring among countries enhance internationaJ forfeiture actions by
creating incentives for countries to work together, regardless of where the assets are
located or which jurisdiction will ultimately enforce the forfeiture order. Only by
working together a t th e international levels will we be able to s tem the flow of criminal
proceeds and cripple criminal organizations.

Cross-border Jurisdictional Issues
The issue of the appropriate juris dic tion in which to commence action against the
perpetrator of an international money launde rer should not arise so long as the asse ts
are present within the jurisdiction. Courts s hould a lso be sensitive in deciding an
application for extradition or of forum non conveniens.
Now that the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 200-l is in place, the greatest
challenge facing those involved in the nefarious act o f money laundering in the
country is to embrace hones ty, probity, accountabi lity and trans parency in all their
dealings. In addition to this is the overriding n ecessity to exude the spirit of hard-work
and indus try, which generates p roductivity and progress in human s ociety. Also, to
fortify the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and m ak e it not go the
way of other agencies tha t initially s tarted well but late r lost s team, the Federal
Governme nt should s how strong political leadership in the funding of the
commission. Accordingly, the EFCC should be provided with office headquarters and
zonal offices, along with reliable working materials. The s taff of the EFCC should be
adequately motivated through economic means like attractive s alaries and allowances
given th e sensitive nature of the job they perform which requires h igh level o f integ rity
and con fidentiality. While the Federal Government is being u rged to put in place a
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macro-economic framework that repels poverty and economic disillusionment, which
are the major factors leading some people into such crimes, it is expected that
Nigerians would give the Commission the much-needed cooperation and support to
enable it succeed.

VI.2 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper has reviewed in general the activities of money launderers and argued
strongly that money laundering activities do not only harm individuals, but also
sometimes cause great loss to public property, and could result in damaging of
investors' confidence in doing business in a particular country, leading them to invest
elsewh ere. In the paper, it was established that money laundering cons titutes a
problem to igeria's economic development efforts. To this end, a review of efforts
towards combating money laundering and other crimes in Nigeria was carried out in
the paper. Some issues and challenges emerging from the country's efforts towards
combating money laundering were also examined. The paper, therefore, concluded by
calling for a technologically driven regulatory framework, reforms of the existing law
of evidence to tackle electronic dimension of money laundering and domestic
forfeiture laws, enhanced resources for financial ins titutions supervision, training and
re-training of bank staff on money laundering techniques and finally, a need for global
cooperation in implementing money laundering laws and jurisdictional issues.
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